Cheat sensitive quantum bit commitment (CSQBC) loosens the security requirement of quantum bit commitment (QBC), so that the existing impossibility proofs of unconditionally secure QBC can be evaded. But here we analyze the common features in all existing CSQBC protocols, and show that in any CSQBC having these features, the receiver can always learn a non-trivial amount of information on the sender's committed bit before it is unveiled, while his cheating can pass the security check with a probability not less than 50%.
a quantum system Ψ encoding Alice's committed bit b.
(Ψ can either be prepared by the sender Alice, or be prepared by Bob and sent to Alice, who returns it to Bob after performing some certain operations according to her choice of b. It also does not matter whether Alice prepared and kept another quantum system entangling with Ψ.) (2) Bob knows the definitions of ρ (3) To detect Bob's cheating, at the unveil phase Alice can check whether the state of Ψ is intact. (It does not matter whether the entire Ψ or only a small part can be checked.) (4) To detect Alice's cheating, at the unveil phase Bob can learn a nontrivial amount of information on the value of b from Ψ, even without any help from Alice.
The last feature indicates that there exists at least one operation known to Bob, which can output a bit b ′ when being applied on Ψ, and b ′ = b should occur with a probability larger than 1/2. As a result, there must be ρ
. This is a main difference from the original QBC, where there is generally ρ 0 ≃ ρ 1 so that it can be unconditionally secure against a dishonest Bob.
The original purpose of CSQBC having these features is as follows. Alice's cheating strategy suggested in the MLC no-go theorem is based on the Hughston-JozsaWootters (HJW) theorem [11] , which applies to the case ρ 0 ≃ ρ 1 . Therefore with feature (4), i.e., ρ and performs measurements to discriminate the committed bit b, the quantum state will be disturbed. In this case, with feature (3) Bob's cheating will be detected with a certain probability when Alice asks him to return the quantum state and checks wether it remains undisturbed, so that the goal of CSQBC can be met.
But with a rigorous quantitative analysis on the prob-ability of detecting Bob's cheating, we will find that it is always not sufficiently large when Bob applies some specific measurements. Therefore any CSQBC protocol having the above features will be bounded by the security limit below. Bob's cheating strategy is as follows. According to Eq. (9.22) of [12] , the trace distance D(ρ
where the maximization is taken over all positive operators P ≤ I. The above feature (2) . Now we will show that the disturbance on the quantum state of Ψ caused by this POVM is so small, that it can pass Alice's security check with at least 50% chances. In fact, we will prove that this result applies to any POVM containing only two positive projectors {P, I − P }, thus the above {P m , I − P m } is surely covered.
Let H be the global Hilbert space constructed by all possible states of Ψ (either b = 0 or 1). Since P is a positive projector, there exists an orthonormal basis {|e i } of H (the following proof remains valid regardless whether {|e i } is known to Alice or Bob), in which P can be expressed as
where {|e
Meanwhile, before Bob applying any measurement, the general form of the initial state of Ψ can always be written as
where {|e 
know that this will occurs with the probability
while the resultant state of Φ ⊗ Ψ is
As described in feature (3) of CSQBC, at the unveil phase Alice may require Bob to return Ψ and check whether it remains intact in its initial state. The maximal probability for Alice to find out that Bob has already projected |Φ ⊗ Ψ 0 into |Φ ⊗ Ψ I is bounded bỹ
Thus the total probability for (case (I) occurred) AN D (Alice failed to detect Bob's cheating) is
The projection is unsuccessful. Obviously, this case will occurs with the probability
Meanwhile, the resultant state of Φ ⊗ Ψ in this case is
The maximal probability for Alice to find out that Bob has already projected |Φ ⊗ Ψ 0 into |Φ ⊗ Ψ II is bounded byp
Thus the total probability for (case (II) occurred) AN D (Alice failed to detect Bob's cheating) is
Taking both cases (I) and (II) into consideration, the overall probability for Bob's cheating to pass Alice's detection successfully is
Since 0 ≤ p I ≤ 1, there is always
The minimum P c = 50% can be reached when p I = 1/2. Thus we come to the conclusion that Bob can always learn Alice's committed b with the maximal probability allowed by the trace distance between ρ B 0 and ρ B 1 , while his cheating stands at least 50% chance to escape Alice's detection.
As a simple example, consider the CSQBC protocol in [5] , where Bob's system Ψ is a single qubit, whose state is either ′ will match Alice's actual committed bit b with the probability cos 2 (π/8) ≃ 85.36%. Meanwhile, Alice's four input states can be expanded in the {|e ′ , |e ′′ } basis as
Comparing with Eqs. (3) and (4), we can see that there is either p I = cos 2 (π/8) or p I = sin 2 (π/8). Substitute them into Eq. (10) will both yield P c = sin 4 (π/8)+cos 4 (π/8) = 75%. That is, in the CSQBC protocol in [5] , Bob can learn Alice's committed bit with reliability 85.36% before the unveil phase, while he can pass Alice's security check with probability 75%. This is consistent with but does not saturate the security bound Eq. (11), i.e., the protocol is not optimal for detecting Bob's cheating.
Another example can be found in [13] , where we illustrated how the above cheating strategy applies on the CSQBC protocol in [9] . This protocol looks more complicated than the one in [5] , as the committed bit b is encoded with many qubits, instead of a single one. The authors merely analyzed the individual attack of the receiver (note that the names Alice and Bob are used reversely in [9] ) where the qubits are measured one by one. Then it concluded that the cheating can be detected with a probability arbitrarily close to 1. But as we shown above, instead of individual measurements, the dishonest receiver can apply a two-element POVM {P, I − P } on the entire state encoding the committed bit. When this state consists of many qubits, each basis vector |e i of the Hilbert space H is a multi-level state describing all qubits. Thus the projector P in Eq. (2) actually represents a collective measurement. The detailed form of P is given in Eq. (2) of [13] . As a result, it was further elaborated there that this collective measurement is as effective as individual measurements on learning the committed bit, while it causes much less disturbance on the multi-qubit state. Once again, the probability for the cheater to escape the detection was shown [13] to be not less than 50%. With the increase of the qubit number n, this probability can even be arbitrarily close to 100%.
In summary, we showed that any CSQBC protocol having the above four features is subjected to the security bound Eq. (11). Our result should not be considered as a generalization of the MLC no-go proof. Instead, it is a complement. This is because the MLC no-go proof applies to QBC protocol with ρ 0 ≃ ρ 1 . But as pointed out in [9] , CSQBC does not need to satisfy this requirement so that it may evade the MLC theorem. On the contrary, our proof works for the case ρ 0 = ρ 1 , thus it fills the gap where the MLC proof left. Meanwhile, the MLC theorem concentrates on the cheating of Alice. It does not exclude the existence of protocols which is unconditionally secure against dishonest Bob only. On the other hand, our result shows that Bob can always cheat in CSQBC regardless Alice is honest or not.
It will be interesting to study whether there can be CSQBC protocols without the above four features. It seems that Kent's relativistic QBC [14] [15] [16] and our recent proposals [17, 18] do not satisfy feature (1) , while the protocol in [19] does not have feature (2), as elaborated in [20] . However, these works are aimed to achieve the original QBC, instead of CSQBC. Also, [17] [18] [19] [20] have not gained wide recognition yet. Thus it is still an open question whether it is possible to build non-relativistic CSQBC protocols which are not limited by the above security bound, without relying on computational and experimental constraints.
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